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The last decade saw severe drought in the south-eastern United States, which 
presented questions about the ways in which Americans use water and the best 
ways for government entities to handle future drought. During and after the 
droughts, researchers examined existing literature on water over-consumption 
and conducted new studies to explore water use and related behaviour. We 
review the predominant work on the factors that influence household water 
consumption, the different methods by which government agencies can combat 
over-consumption, and argue for the demand-side approach of structured rate 
increases to limit superfluous use of water. An inclining block rate structure 
both forces consumers to contemplate water use before and during droughts 
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Part 1: Behavioural Factors Influencing Household Water Consumption 
 
Introduction 
Given the uncertainty of supply and the national growing demand for water, the 
need for efficiency in water use is significant. However, managing the demand for water 
requires knowledge of how people use water, as well as in the relationship between 
psychological and behavioural aspects of water consumption (Gregory & Di Leo, 2003, 
p. 1262).   
This paper examines existing literature on factors affecting water consumption 
including but not limited to: income, environmental awareness, and government 
regulation. Specifically, it investigates the psychological elements affecting people’s 
behaviour, and then discusses water management methods to reduce water usage. By 
understanding psychological factors affecting water consumption, water-managing 
entities may develop more efficient and sustainable policies.  
Literature Review 
Obstacles to accurately interpreting and explaining existing literature on water 
consumption are threefold. First, the bulk of relevant research takes the form of non-
peer reviewed technical reports, case studies and consultancy reports (Gregory & Di 
Leo, 2003, pp. 1262-63). Second, the implementation and outcomes of water 
conservation measures tend to be context specific such that generalizations are difficult 
to draw a meaningful framework for future applications (Atwood, Kreutzweiser, & Loe, 
2007, p. 428). Third, while issue specific factors constrain water conservation strategies, 
their theoretical underpinnings are derived from general theories of consumer behaviour 
developed in non-water contexts (e.g., household recycling, household energy 
conservation, private goods consumption, etc.). 
Models of household water use behaviour, derived from the studies discussed below 
attempt to predict household water consumption. The success of household water 
demand management strategies depends on how well we understand the way people 
think about water and water use. Is water conservation more likely when individuals 
believe that water is scarce or when they perceive that other consumers are also 
conserving water? 
ECJ Volume 2, No. 1, 2012 
Studies conducted before, during, and after the southeast drought of 2007-2008 
identify a range of factors influencing household water use. Below is a discussion of 
those factors, including: 1) personal characteristics (e.g., subjective norm, behavioural 
control, attitude toward the behaviour) (Gregory & Di Leo, 2003, pp. 1261-1296); 2) 
environmental values and conservation attitudes; and Socio-economic factors (e.g., 
income, household composition, age, gender, education, etc.) (Jorgensen, Graymore, & 
O’Toole, 2009, p. 229); 3) Institutional trust (i.e., trust in the water provider) (Corral-
Verdugo et al., 2002, pp. 533-35; Heiman, 2002, p. 84); and 4) Inter-personal trust (i.e., 
trust in other consumers) (Corral-Verdugo et al., 2002, pp. 527-28, 533-34). 
Psychological Factors 
Gary D. Gregory and Michael Di Leo (2003) studied the existing theory in social 
and environmental psychology and developed a model to study important predictors of 
water consumption (pp. 1261–1296). Their study explored relationships between various 
psychological aspects and water consumption. A review of past research findings 
allowed them to develop a model that measures the effects of stimuli (e.g., 
environmental awareness), reasoned processes (e.g., attitudes, personal involvement), 
unreasoned processes (e.g., habits), and situational influences (e.g., income and 
household size) on water consumption behaviour (pp. 1262, 1267). 
The following factors have predictive ability on water consumption behaviour:  
environmental awareness, personal involvement, demographic characteristics, and habits 
and reflexes. Additionally, households with lower water usage and that display greater 
awareness of water conservation issues are more highly involved in the decision to use 
water and tend to form habits associated with lower usage levels. These results are 
consistent with past research that attitudes toward water usage appear to be poor 
predictors of water consumption behaviour. After controlling for situational factors (e.g., 
household size), Gregory and Di Leo (2003) findings substantiated the role of personal 
involvement and habit formation in explaining water consumption (pp. 1266-67, 1277, 
1280-86). 
The results of Gregory’s and Di Leo‘s (2003) study did not generally support past 
findings. From existing studies, Gregory and Di Leo found that pro-conservationists are 
younger and more highly educated than are non-conservationists. Also, higher income 
families tend to be more involved in pro-environmental activities, have greater concern 
for the environment, and participate to a greater extent in conservation activities than do 
lower income families (p. 1267). This finding was also reflected in a study which found 
that people with a high income, more education, and high status jobs were more likely to 
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engage in water saving practices (Berk et al., 1993, p. 236, 242-43). However, Gregory`s 
and Di Leo’s (2003) results indicated that households with greater awareness and 
involvement in the decision to use water were older, had lower income and educational 
levels, and had fewer people living in the household. They assumed the discrepancy 
between past findings and their findings may be a result of household life cycles, or the 
different phases of collective household members experience over time (p. 1283). 
When behaviours are habitual, it is challenging to change people’s attitudes towards 
their actions. Much of the relevant work in environmental psychology focuses on 
reasoned influences, such as attitude change, even though the literature cited suggests a 
weak link between general attitudes and environmental behaviour. Only recently has 
research on past behaviour habits achieved popularity in environmental psychology. 
Gregory and Di Leo (2003) suggest that when strong habits exist, persuasive efforts to 
change attitudes may have little effect on behaviour. Conversely, increasing the level of 
personal involvement can lead to the consideration of alternative choices and the 
weakening of existing habits. According to behavioural decision theory, understanding 
the factors that maintain routine responses is a first step toward developing successful 
intervention strategies to change habitual behaviour (p. 1285). 
Persuasive communications can serve as stimuli to change one’s predisposition 
toward a particular behaviour or motivate one to become more involved in the 
behavioural process. As Gregory and Di Leo (2003) concluded, “a greater understanding 
of how awareness affects both reasoned and unreasoned influences will enable water-
management authorities to devise more effective environmental awareness campaigns to 
encourage water conservation behaviour,” (p. 1286). Although research in environmental 
behaviour is abundant, past studies attempting to link psychological variables to 
conservation behaviour produced mixed findings and are inconclusive. Moreover, the 
ambiguity of those results could be due to the fact that such research has concentrated 
on recycling and electricity conservation, with relatively few studies investigating the 
psychological aspects of household water usage (pp. 1262-63). 
The Trust Factor 
Conservation motives significantly reduce annual water consumption. University of 
Sonora Professor Victor Corral-Verdugo, Frias-Armenta, Perez-Urias, Orduna-Cabrera, 
and Espinoza-Gallego (2002) investigated the factors influencing Mexican citizens’ water 
use and found that people must trust each other and those who supply them water 
before they will reduce their usage (pp. 527-535). Conservation motives included 
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reducing the amount of money spent on water, social norms (i.e., neighbours try to 
conserve water), and wanting to comply with conservation campaigns (p. 530).   
People’s perception of the amount of water used by those around them often 
influences their own usage. Corral-Verdugo et al.’s (2002) model found that the 
perception that others were wasting water decreased conservation motives and resulted 
in increased water consumption. If people do not trust others to conserve water, they 
will use this to justify their own lack of motivation to conserve, which results in their 
own higher water consumption (pp. 527-28, 533-34). Similar to Dr. Garrett Hardin’s 
Tragedy of the Commons, the shared resource, in this case grassland is depleted through 
self-interested actions. The tragedy of the commons is a dilemma arising from multiple 
individuals, acting independently and rationally concerning their individual self-interest, 
but ultimately depleting a shared limited resource even though it is contrary to 
everyone’s interest in the long run. The individual’s rational behaviour leads to a 
situation in which everyone is worse off than they might have been otherwise (Hardin, as 
cited in Jorgensen et al., 2009, p. 229). 
Hardin's classic example is a hypothetical situation about herders sharing a common 
parcel of land on which they are all entitled to let their cows graze. It is in each herder's 
interest to put each succeeding cow he acquires onto the land, even if the carrying 
capacity of the common is exceeded and it is temporarily or permanently damaged as a 
result. The herder receives all of the benefits from an additional cow, but the entire 
group collectively shares the damage. If all herders make this individually rational 
economic decision, the common will be depleted or even destroyed to the detriment of 
all (Jorgensen et al., 2009, p. 229). 
For efficient usage, people must also trust that the water authority is doing all it can 
to provide enough water. If the public believes water agencies are untrustworthy, they 
may be unreceptive to initiatives that managers propose as a means of conserving water 
and securing supply (Corral-Verdugo et al., 2002, pp. 533-35). Water conservation by the 
public requires institutional trust; willingness to conserve increases with governmental 
conservation efforts and supply increases (Heiman, 2002, p. 84). People are more willing 
to save water when they believe the water authority and government are also doing their 
part to ensure supplies. 
The Corral-Verdugo et al. (2002) study also found a disparity between perceived and 
actual consumption in different sectors. Participants thought that city dwellers use a 
higher percentage of the water supply than they actually do (31% compared to 8.5%) and 
farmers use less than they actually do (24% compared to 83.3%) (p. 532). These findings 
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demonstrate that people’s perceptions of how others use water are not in line with 
reality. Furthermore, their perceptions of how others use water can impact their own 
water use. When individuals surveyed did not trust others to save water, they felt no 
obligation to save water themselves. This model suggests that actual water use is 
influenced by perceptions of how others use water, both wasting and conserving.  
A Human Connection to Nature 
The problem of overconsumption may also stem from a disconnect between people 
and nature. Law professor Eric Freygogle, an authority on the issues of human 
interaction with nature, candidly summed up this gap in the relationship: “We are 
disconnected from nature in our ethics, our knowledge and understanding, and our 
behaviour.” Freygogle believes Americans engage in environmentally harmful land 
activities because we lack an environmental ethic that values nature. Instead, we “should 
seek ecological health in our land practices;” we place too much value on self-
gratification, individualism, and “consumeristic” consumption (Arnold, 2005, p. 10171). 
Public Perception of Water 
Another systemic factor influencing overconsumption is the general public’s 
knowledge deficiency on the most basic information about water. The public’s 
perception of its role in causing or helping to resolve water supply and quality problems 
is poorly developed. Approximately three-fourths of the public is concerned about 
household water supply, one-third believes that their supply is “not as safe as it should 
be,” forty percent believe that standards for protecting drinking water quality should be 
“stricter,” and less than one-third of the public know the major sources of water 
pollution in their communities. Most do not think that runoff from farms, parking lots, 
or even residences are a major cause of water pollution (Feldman, 2007, p. 276). 
Outdoor Water Uses 
Outside water use behaviours are important targets for changes in water 
consumption. Michael Loh and Peter Coghlan (2003) studied water use in Perth, 
Australia, and found that inside water use is relatively stable across seasons, 
socioeconomic groups and housing types (p. 1). The only differences were dependent on 
household size and appliance ownership. Additionally, 56% of Perth’s household water 
use is for purposes outside the dwelling (pp. 25, 27). 
Professor Geoff Syme, Blair Nancarrow, and Clive Seligman, (2000) specifically 
investigated outdoor water use and discovered that lifestyle (e.g., importance to lifestyle 
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of large garden, large lawn, green home environment, etc.), recreation in the garden, and 
enjoyment of gardening are all interrelated and contribute to higher water use (pp. 539-
78). Syme et al. (1990-1991) measured homeowner’s attitudes against their actual water 
consumption for a year. They found that attitudes pertaining to garden importance as a 
house investment and a source of recreation, expenditure on garden, and attitude toward 
water price were all significant predictors of household water use (pp. 167-68).  
People exercise greater choice in reducing outdoor uses of water than indoor uses. 
A plurality of studies show that people are more conscientious in reducing lawn 
irrigation or washing cars than they are in showering or flushing toilets. Effective 
demand-side management strategies should focus on changing garden water use 
behaviours among households that highly value gardens, in combination with increasing 
prices (Feldman, 2007, p. 299).  
Promoting Behavioural Change in Water Use 
By understanding the effects of psychological factors on consumption, water 
management authorities can better identify solutions. Having identified factors 
influencing water behaviour, we now examine methods to change behaviour. In the 
process of encouraging behaviour change, we recommend employing demand-side 
strategies. 
Communication gives people a reason to cooperate in reducing water usage because 
it gives them the opportunity to make explicit commitments and promises about what 
they will do. More specifically, it offers an opportunity for moral persuasion, or an 
appeal to what people believe is the right thing to do. Communication facilitates 
cooperation. Cooperation increases significantly when individuals are given the chance 
to talk with each other. Communication and cooperation provide communities with a 
sense of social responsibility; individuals recognize a shared interest and trust that their 
neighbours will also conserve water (Atwood et al., 2007, p. 534). Cooperation provides 
the individual consumer with a group identity. Group identity in turn encourages 
cooperation among members. 
The availability of water saving technologies is essential. Clarke and Brown (2006) 
investigated the receptivity within a community to using alternative water sources and 
technologies and found that demographic influence was weak, but the ability and 
capacity of individuals to acquire and apply household water saving and reuse measures 
is a fundamental factor for behavioural change (pp. 251-58). Upon further investigation, 
they discovered that simply having the ability to purchase more water saving devices 
contributed to water saving behaviours.  
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Education is also important; “the public is generally inclined to learn more about 
water problems if the opportunity to do so is afforded them” (Feldman, 2007, p. 277). 
David Feldman (2007), author of Water Policy for Sustainable Development, argues that 
education helps teach consumers and the public what is involved in keeping water 
flowing from the faucet. Conservation alone may not be enough, but ignorance is a 
significant factor in over usage. Encouraging conservation is difficult because the general 
public is unsure where and how it derives its water and thus fails to realize its role in 
water demand and its potential role in saving water (p. 299). Conservation requires 
education and greater information about water use and the public’s effect on the water 
supply. Water providers can employ a dissemination of knowledge to inform consumers 
about the need to change behaviours relating to conserving water, and give them 
suggestions on how to do so. 
Part I - Conclusion 
Part one of this paper reviewed five major models of household water consumption, 
and found that while many studies highlighted different factors acting on water use 
behaviour, none of them attributed all of the variation in water use to the factors they 
examined. There are other variables impacting water use that this paper has not yet 
visited.  
Trust is an important factor that has not been fully explored but that can be useful 
in the development of effective water management strategies. Trust in the water 
authority and trust among community members (including residents, farmers, and 
industry) to take steps to reduce their water consumption will increase the likelihood that 
people will actively reduce their own water use. Therefore, these two kinds of trust are 
essential to engender a water saving response from the whole community and to ensure 
the success of water demand programs. But how can we measure trust? Further 
investigation is needed to determine the exact role that trust plays in determining 
household water use behaviour. 
We now address questions about the interactions between water management 
pricing strategies, water restrictions, restrictions in water supply, and individual 
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Part 2: Conservation through Water Management Policies 
There are three major players in water management: the people and organizations 
who use water; the entities that distribute it; and the different levels of government that 
regulate it. This section discusses the major methods by which that last group, the 
regulating agencies, deal with excess water consumption, especially during droughts. 
They must balance the psychological and sociological factors behind water consumption 
against the need to conserve water. After detailing the methods of water management, a 
way in which regulating bodies may both conserve water and generate revenue to help 
prepare for future water shortages will be proposed. 
Methods of Water Management 
There are four major methods of water management: mandatory restrictions on 
usage; rebates and giveaways; educational programs; and rate increases. Each method has 
benefits and detriments, but one method, rate increases, has far-reaching economic and 
financial benefits that outweigh its detriments and allow government agencies to restrict 
water use in a transparent, efficient way. 
Mandatory Restrictions  
Water regulating entities may restrict water use by residents and businesses using 
criminal penalties such as fines as a disincentive to excessive usage. This is a very 
common method of regulation, and several urban areas in the southeast United States 
employed mandatory restrictions during the drought of the late 2000s. Several cities 
banned lawn irrigation. The City of Raleigh, North Carolina banned most car washing, 
filling new swimming pools, and serving drinking water at restaurants unless requested 
by diners (Manuel, 2008, pp. A 170-171). In Georgia, Governor Sonny Perdue urged 
Georgians “to make their dry lawns and dirty cars a badge of honour” in October of 
2007 (P A 170). 
The advantage of mandatory restrictions on water usage is that it usually works — 
at least in the short run. The fear of legal penalties prevents citizens from using water for 
any non-essential purposes. Northern Georgia, including Atlanta, experienced a 13.3% 
decrease in water usage from 2007 to 2008 after implementing restrictions on use 
(Manuel, 2008, p. A 170).  
The major disadvantages of mandatory restrictions are two-fold. First, they are only 
successful in the short run. Political pressure from upset water users can coerce elected 
officials to alleviate the severity of the restrictions, or lift them entirely. Policy makers, 
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understandably weary of a dissatisfied constituency, are vulnerable to the whims of those 
who want to use more water than is reasonably available during a severe drought. After 
Georgia’s initial success with mandatory restrictions, the state completely dropped all 
penalties against power plants, citing the importance of the state’s power grid (Manuel, 
2008, p. A 170). Giving in to such pressure can curb governmental efforts to conserve 
water. 
The second disadvantage of mandatory restrictions is the fatal flaw that exists in 
many types of criminal penalties: if individuals believe that the benefit of breaking the 
law outweighs the consequences, they will break the law. A wealthy homeowner who has 
acres of property (the type of person likely to need lots of water to irrigate her lawn and 
landscaping) may have the resources to pay a fine for excessive use. Conversely, to an 
indigent person who lives in a small apartment and does not own a vehicle, the fine is 
not only un-payable but also irrelevant; he or she will never violate a restriction against 
irrigating residential property. Policymakers can curtail this disadvantage by 
implementing harsh penalties against excessive water use, but then they must face the 
threat of a disgruntled constituency. 
Rebates and Giveaways 
Devices such as low-flow toilets, shower heads, and faucet aerators can significantly 
reduce household water usage, and many regulating agencies either directly offer rebates 
or subsidize the use of water conserving products. Low flow products successfully 
reduce usage, but have historically shown mixed results due to government budgetary 
constraints or the sheer severity of a drought. After discovering that fitting existing 
homes with water saving devices reduced household usage by about 46%, the City of 
Tampa offered citizens $100 on low-flow toilets. From 1993–2005, the subsidy helped 
replace 33,765 toilets and saved about 434 million gallons of water each year. However, 
the program costs $3,000,000 during those twelve years, and ended in 2008 due to 
budget constraints (Manuel, 2008, p. A 170). Santa Barbara, CA, in the middle of a 
severe drought in 1988, gave away free low-flow showerheads and offered rebates for 
low-flow toilets. However, the drought (during which rainfall levels fluctuated from 94 
percent to 30 percent of historical norms) persisted, and the city eventually took up 
more severe methods of regulation, including increased rates and mandatory restrictions 
(Renwick & Archibald, 1998, p. 348). Water saving household devices are certainly a part 
of the long term solutions, but they cannot combat a drought in the short run. 
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Educational Programs 
Different levels of government sometimes organize educational programs to teach 
citizens why they should conserve water and how to do so. For example, the EPA funds 
the “WaterSense” program, which shows attendees how to cut their usage by 20% 
(Manuel, 2008, p. A 170). Major problems with these programs (or any government-ran 
educational program) are that: 1) they often require participation, or at least high 
amounts of reading, effort, etc., which discourages working adults from partaking; and 2) 
people do not always trust government entities to instruct them on how to use a 
resource such as water. 
The fourth method of reducing usage is increasing the monetary costs of water. 
Economists contend that as prices increase, the quantity demanded, or amount of water 
used, will decrease (Mankiw, 2009, p. 7). Therefore, as water suppliers increase prices, 
people should use less water. Several municipalities used this method successfully during 
the recent drought in the south-eastern United States, and it is arguably the most 
efficient solution to over-consumption in both the long term and the short term. 
Conservation-minded rate increases commonly take two forms: inclining block rates 
or seasonal rates. The former charges water users an increasing rate as their usage 
increases. (Figure 1 shows a simplified hypothetical schedule to demonstrate the desired 
effect of inclining block rates.) Regulating bodies can increase the overall price of water 
so that any amount used during a drought costs more than water prior to a drought. 
Seasonal rate increase prices by larger amounts at times of the year when aquifers and 
streams are especially vulnerable. Either way, regulators can encourage citizens to 
conserve water by threat of higher costs (Georgia Environmental Protection, 2007, pp. 
8-9; Borisova & Rawls, 2010, pp. 16-17). 
The obvious detriment of increasing water rates is the risk of a disgruntled citizenry. 
As with mandatory restrictions, Americans do not like government entities affecting 
their household budgets. While restrictions regulate their actions, increased rates act on 
their wallets. However, the nature of increased rates makes it less offensive than 
mandatory restrictions because it gives water users some freedom to control how much 
regulation affects them; if they conserve water, they will not be charged higher rates. It is 
not as intrusive as Raleigh’s “water police” citing people as criminals. 
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Efficiency of Rate Increases 
A rate increase can have the benefit of decreasing water usage (see above), but it 
also can be an important tool for government agencies to raise funds. Those funds could 
be used to directly combat the effects of drought, or for any other public welfare project. 
Governments raise revenue through taxes, and a government-imposed rate increase 
for water is a type of tax. In Figure 2 (Appendices), a population’s aggregate demand 
(D1) for water is a downward sloping line because people will consume less water as 
prices increase. It is a steep line because the demand for water is ‘price inelastic’, 
meaning that changes in price do not have as great an impact on water as on some 
goods. It is, however, somewhat affected by price changes. Notice also that there is 
never a point at which consumption equals zero (D1 never crosses the horizontal [price] 
axis); no matter how expensive, people still need water. In this hypothetical, water costs 
one dollar per gallon (P1), and consumers will purchase fifty gallons (Q1) at that price. 
Everything else remaining equal, that is the amount of water citizens will use. In Figure 3 
(Appendices), a regulating entity has doubled the price (P1 to P2), and quantity 
demanded has subsequently fallen to forty gallons (Q2).  
A major criticism against rate increases is the inelastic nature of water. However, 
water is not perfectly inelastic, and is therefore still sensitive to price changes. Rainfall 
and temperatures determine the supply of water, but utility providers exercise some 
control over it because of their ability to use dams/reservoirs and by controlling the 
amount of water they extract and process for human consumption. In the hypothetical, 
the rate increase has successfully decreased water usage. The decreased quantity of water 
demanded illustrated in Figure 4 (Appendices) is a simplified but realistic representation 
of the effectiveness of rate increases in “real world” scenarios. Figure 4 illustrates the 
revenue generated by charges attached to water rates. This amount can also be found 
with a simple equation: Quantity X Price of the Increase = Revenue. In this hypothetical, 40 X 
1 = $40. In an actual city, county, or state-wide economy, this would obviously be a very 
large amount. Legislative bodies, when enacting a rate increase, can earmark future 
revenue generated by the increase to benefit the people who pay the rates. If water users 
can see direct benefits from the extra funds they pay, they may not be so quick to 
condemn rate increases. They will still not want to pay more for water, so usage should 
decrease, but they may be more willing to accept governmental action, even if it means 
financial consequences to individuals. 
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Possible Use of Revenue Generated from Rate Increases 
Revenue generated by increased rates should be spent mitigating the effect of 
current and future drought. The former can be achieved through bailouts for industries 
hard hit by drought (e.g. local agriculture and tourism) and the former through investing 
in sources of electricity that are not derived from water or fossil fuels. The benefit of 
promoting non-hydroelectric energy in hydroelectricity dependant drought-prone 
regions is obvious: during times of drought, the source of the region’s electricity often 
dries up with the rest of the region’s water. The reasons for promoting non-fossil fuel 
sources of power in those regions are not as obvious but just as vital. 
Drought in the twenty first century is part of a cycle that begins and ends with fossil 
fuels. The burning of fossil fuels and the consequential warming of the planet’s 
atmosphere lead to higher average temperatures, which in turn lead to higher rates of 
evaporation. Evaporation, when spread over an entire region, dramatically worsens the 
effects of a drought. The problem becomes not only the lack of rainfall, but also the 
decreasing amount of water already held in groundwater, lakes, and streams. As that 
water decreases, hydroelectric sources fail, and energy providers are forced to 
compensate by burning fossil fuels (Manuel, 2008, pp. A 168, 170). Revenue generated 
from rate increases could be used to promote alternative fuel sources. The alternative 
sources can be used now to alleviate the current state of global warming, and later, in 
times of drought, to offset the loss of hydroelectricity. 
Conclusion 
There are four major methods of water management to reduce water usage during 
droughts; of those four methods, increasing rates that citizens pay for water is the most 
viable in the long term. Not only can it decrease water usage, but it can also increase 
revenue. Government entities can use the additional revenue to benefit the people who 
contributed to it: and should use it to curtail the effects of future drought. 
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Hypothetical Simplified Inclining Block Rate Structure 
Gallons of Water Rate Change from Starting 
Price 
Price Max 
0-100 $.01/gal -- $1.00 
100-200 $.02/gal +100% $4.00 
200-300 $.03/gal +200% $9.00 
300-400 $.04/gal +300% $16.00 
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